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Abstract: 
Rank reversal is a common phenomenon in decision making. Rank reversal occurs when a new 
alternative is added to (or removed from) a set of alternatives, which causes change in the 
ranking order of the alternatives. This paper studies the possible causes of rank reversal in 
reciprocal preference relation based on additive consistency. Our investigation reveals that 
inconsistency of information is the main cause of this phenomena in preference relations 
followed by ranking score aggregation. We propose score aggregation methods to address the 
phenomenon of rank reversal. The proposed methods are illustrated using numerical examples. 
The results are better than other tested methods.   
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Multi-Criteria Decision-making (MCDM) is a field with many strengths, among which is its 
ability to assist decision-makers in solving difficult decisions involving conflicting criteria and to 
help them learn more about their preferences. However, some methods are known to exhibit a 
phenomenon called rank reversal. Rank reversal occurs when a new alternative is added to (or 
removed from) a set of alternatives, which causes a change in the ranking order of the 
alternatives (Barzilai & Golany, 1994). The literature on decision-making reveals that a number 
of methods suffer from this phenomenon. Some of them are Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
(Barzilai & Golany, 1994; Wang & Luo, 2009), Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity 
to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) (Wang et al., 2007; Wang & Luo, 2009), ELimination and Choice 
Expressing Reality (ELECTRE), Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment 
Evaluations (PROMETHEE) (Frini et al., 2012; Mareschal et al., 2008), Data Envelopment 
analysis - Analytic hierarchy process (DEAHP), Borda-Kendall (BK) (Wang & Luo, 2009) and 
Weighted Sum Method (WSM)( Wang & Luo, 2009).  
The rank reversal phenomenon has raised concerns against the use of affected methods, 
especially AHP. Rank reversal could be of two types: partial or total. Partial rank reversal 
happens to limited alternatives while other alternatives still have the same ordering. For example, 
suppose that the current ranking of three alternatives is         , such that alternative    is 
preferred over alternative    and    respectively. However, when a new alternative   , which is 
not dominant, is introduced, the ranking could become             . Notice that 
alternative    now becomes second while alternative    is first. This is called partial rank 





the whole ranking order is reversed. In this case, the best alternative becomes the worst and the 
worst becomes the best             (Dymova et al., 2013; Garcia-Cascales & Lamata, 
2012).  
Belton and Gear (1983) were the first to notice this phenomenon in AHP. Since then, the 
literature of MCDM has been in debate about the impact of this phenomenon, and the validity of 
the affected methods. Many researchers such as Dyer (1990), Schenkerman (1994), Perez (1995), 
and Leung and Cao (2001) criticized the exhibited methods, whereas researchers such as Saaty 
and Vargas (1984), Saaty (1987), Forman (1990), and Millet and Saaty (2000) argued for the 
legitimacy of this phenomenon.  
To emphasize the phenomenon of rank reversal, we point the reader to the contraction 
consistency condition mentioned by Pavlicic (2001) adopted from Amartya Sen that states: 
Contraction consistency condition: If alternative   is the best in the set of alternatives   such 
that    , then it has to be the best in every subset     where    . 
This phenomenon could drive some decision-makers away from using methods known to have 
rank reversal, even if they are well-known. For instance, recently Anbaroglu et al. (2014) chose 
to use the Weighted Product Model (WPM) instead of relying on well-known and widely used 
models such as AHP and WSM just because it does not suffer from any kind of rank reversal 
issues. Furthermore, they commented on the problem of rank reversal as “a serious limitation” of 
the MCDM field, which could lead researchers to misunderstand the difference between 
examined alternatives. Therefore, a need for handling this phenomenon is necessary, at least for 





multiplicative preference relations, links this phenomenon to the inconsistency of the data, the 
concept of pairwise comparison on which preference relations are based, the preference 
aggregation method, and the score aggregation method. To our knowledge, there is no complete 
study yet that investigates these three possible reasons for rank reversal in preference relations. 
There is one study, conducted by Leskinen and Kangas (2005), on the inconsistency of pairwise 
comparison based on a regression model. They concluded that inconsistency could lead to rank 
reversal. This phenomenon, however, does not occur when there is single criterion. But, in 
multiple criteria even if the data are consistent, the aggregation method (i.e. arithmetic mean) can 
result in rank reversals.  
In this paper, our goal is to investigate how inconsistency and aggregation methods could lead to 
rank reversal in fuzzy preference relations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present some preliminary 
knowledge on preference relations. In section 3, we present a review of rank reversal literature 
regarding possible causes and attempts to solve rank reversal. In section 4, we study the possible 
causes of rank reversal in preference relation, namely, inconsistency of preference relation, 
aggregation operators, and score aggregation method and their link to rank reversal. In section 5, 
we propose score aggregation methods that have better performance than the sum normalization 
methods in avoiding rank reversal. In section 6, we provide a numerical example. Finally in 







                                              






          
          
    
          
 
 
2. Preliminary Knowledge 
Definition 1 (Urena et al., 2015): A preference relation   is a binary relation defined on the set   
that is characterized by a function         , where   is the domain of representation of 
preference degrees provided by the decision-maker. 
Definition 2 (Xu, 2007): A fuzzy preference relation   on a finite set of alternatives   is 
represented by a matrix                with: 
                                              . 
when         indicates that the expert prefers alternative    over alternative   ;         
indicates that the expert prefers alternative    over alternative   ;          indicates that the 
expert is indifferent between    and   , thus,        . 
Furthermore, the fuzzy preference relation            is additive consistent if and only if the 
following additive transitivity is satisfied (Meng & Chen, 2015; Urena et al., 2015; Herrera-
Viedma et al., 2007a; Tanino, 1984): 
                                                                                                                                                    
Definition 3 (Saaty, 1980): A multiplicative preference relation   on the set                
                                              






        
        
    







of alternatives is defined as a reciprocal matrix                 with the following 
conditions: 
                                         . 
where     is interpreted as the ratio of the preference intensity of the alternative    to   .  
There are several numerical scales for the multiplicative preference relation; however, the most 
popular one is the 1-9 Saaty scale.       means that alternative    and    are indifferent; 
      implies that alternative    is preferred to   . As the ratio of intensity of       increases, 
the stronger is the preference intensity of    over   . Thus,       means that alternative    is 
absolutely preferred to   . 
The multiplicative preference relation            is called consistent if the following 
multiplicative transitivity is satisfied (Saaty, 1980): 
                                   . 
The AHP method, which uses multiplicative preference relations, decomposes complex problems 
into a hierarchy consisting of several levels, where the top level represents the goal and the lower 
levels consist of criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives respectively. The elements in each level are 
compared with each other through pair-wise comparison on a scale of 1-9 to find their relative 
importance. Then the weight for each element is computed using the eigenvector method.  The 
same technique is used at the lower level with respect to a higher level element to find their 





3. Literature Review 
The purpose of this section is to explore the literature of MCDM to investigate possible causes of 
rank reversal phenomena. We will then cover the attempts of researchers to solve this issue. 
Thus, two main subsections will be explored: the literature of rank reversal causes and attempts 
to fix rank reversal.   
3.1. The literature on rank reversal causes’ 
The literature on multiplicative preference relations, especially AHP, discusses three possible 
reasons behind rank reversal, see Table 1: inconsistency, pairwise comparison, and aggregation 
method. Dodd et al. (1995) claimed that Saaty’s AHP misses a form of inconsistency within its 
model, which puts its results under doubt. Farkas et al. (2004) also blamed inconsistency in 
pairwise comparison for this issue. According to Paulson and Zahir (1995), judgmental 
uncertainty could also cause rank reversal. Chou (2012) referred the issue of rank reversal in 
AHP due to the aggregation method. However, researchers like Karapetrovic and Rosenbloom 
(1999) refused to link the problem to inconsistency. They argued that there is no direct relation 
between the consistencies or inconsistencies of pairwise comparison matrices and the occurrence 
of rank reversal. They stated that each could be considered as a separate problem. Ishizaka and 
Labib (2011) agreed with them and reported that rank reversal is independent of the consistency 
of the data and priority method. Moreover, they believed this phenomenon could happen in any 
additive model.  
Other researchers like Schenkerman (1994) believed that the rank reversal in AHP is caused by 





the measurements of the alternatives. Thus, any change in the number of alternatives and 
normalization imposes revising of the criteria weights. Correspondingly, Ishizaka and Labib 
(2011) claimed that the rank reversal phenomenon is related to the method rather than modeling 
procedure and it may not be resolved because aggregation of the standardized units is not simply 
interpretable, which has been even disputed by French school. Lai (1995) pointed out that rank 
reversal happens because of multiplying criteria weights by unrelated normalized scale of 
performance ratings. Dyer (1990) claimed that the problem is not just rank reversal but the AHP 
results are arbitrary. This is because the criteria weights may not be right due to the 
normalization procedure. Triantaphyllou (2001) agreed with Dyer that in AHP or any additive 
variants of it, ranking is arbitrary often which tends to generate rank reversal even if the data is 
perfectly consistent. According to Rosenbloom (1997), researchers tried to resolve this problem 
in AHP by proposing different normalization methods. Perez (1995) argued that the phenomenon 
of rank reversal is common in almost all of ordinal aggregation methods such as AHP. He 
claimed that rank reversal could be avoided if both criteria weights and performance ratings are 
generated from a common space of scales. On the other hand, Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008) 
blamed the eigenvalue method. They stated that the priority vector violates a condition of order 





Table 1: The causes’ literature of rank reversal  
Cause(s) Author(s) Claimed	based	on
Dodd et al., (1995) No	proof
Farkas et al., (2004) No	proof
Uncertainty Paulson and Zahir (1995) Simulation
Aggregation method Chou (2012) No	proof
AHP method and score aggregation Ishizaka and Labib (2011) No	proof





Normalization methods Rosenbloom (1997) No	proof
Eigenvalue method Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008) Examples
Inconsistency
Multiplying criteria weights by 




3.2. Attempts to fix rank reversal 
The rank reversal phenomenon in AHP was initially observed by Belton and Gear in 1983 after 
they discovered that introducing a new similar alternative to the existing ones could reverse the 
ranking of the alternatives. They proposed a modified normalization method to overcome the 
rank reversal issue in the original AHP, which is later known as a Revised AHP. The revised 
method differs from the original AHP prioritization method where each criterion is divided by 
the max value with respect to it for all the alternatives. Later on, this method came to be known 
as the ideal model. Afterwards, Schenkerman (1994) claimed that in methods such as Referenced 
AHP, normalization to maximum entry (ideal model), normalization to minimum entry, and 
linking pins avoid rank reversal only when the criteria are quantitative. On the other hand, Saaty 
(1987) linked rank reversal with the existence of near or similar copies within the set of 
alternatives. To solve this issue, either the set of alternatives has to be revised or more criteria 
need to be considered. Saaty defines a near copy as an alternative that has close values within 





Lootsma (1993), followed by Sheu (2004), claimed that using a geometric mean aggregation 
method in AHP helps to avoid rank reversal. Likewise, Ishizaka and Labib (2011) mentioned that 
using geometric mean in AHP prevents rank reversal since geometric mean in both row and 
column approaches produces the same results, unlike eigenvector methods. Barzilai and Golany 
(1994) stated that the rank reversal problem is related to the structure of AHP mainly through the 
additive aggregation rule. They argued that the multiplicative procedures such as the geometric 
mean and the weighted-geometric-mean aggregation rule are the solution. In fact, some studies 
have shown that multiplicative methods such as the weighted product model and the 
multiplicative AHP are immune against rank reversal (Wang & Triantaphyllou, 2008). Barzilai 
and Lootsma (1997) demonstrated that the multiplicative AHP method does not generate rank 
reversal by testing the method on Belton and Gear’s (1983) example. Additionally, the 
multiplicative variants of the AHP tend to be more reliable and do not show any kind of rank 
reversal, which means they are perfect (Triantaphyllou, 2001). On the other hand, Buede and 
Maxwell (1995) pointed out that using geometric mean “will not eliminate rank reversal,” 
contrary to removing normalization of the ratio scale, which guarantees immunity against rank 
reversal.  
Farkas et al. (2004) developed an approach by determining the intervals for all possible 
occurrences of rank reversals. They demonstrated it for an example of a 3X3 matrix. Recently, 
Rodriguez et al. (2013) proposed a modification to the fuzzy AHP- TOPSIS method with a 
graphical approach for rank reversal detection and analysis. They claimed that this graphical 
approach increases the level of confidence in the results. However, they mentioned that the 
graphical approach is not suitable when large set of criteria is under consideration. Table 2 





Table 2: Some attempts to solve AHP's rank reversal 
Solution Author(s)
Max normalization method Belton and Gear (1983) 
Find the intervals of all  rank reversals Farkas et al. (2004)
Graphical approach Rodriguez et al. (2013)
Exclude/remove near or similar copies of 
the alternatives
Saaty (1987)
Lootsma (1993); Sheu (2004); Ishizaka 
and Labib (2011); Barzilai and Golany 
(1994); Wang and Triantaphyllou (2008); 
Barzilai and Lootsma (1997) 
Geometric mean aggregation method 
 
 
4. Mathematical Investigation of Rank Reversal Causes in Preference Relations 
The literature reveals (summarized on Table 1) reveals that researchers link the phenomenon of 
rank reversal in preference relations to: inconsistency, uncertainty, aggregation method, pairwise 
comparison concept (AHP method), normalization, multiplying criteria weights by unrelated 
normalized scale and eigenvalue method. Observing these claims deeply, we notice that 
uncertainty of information results in inconsistent input. Normalization, multiplying criteria 
weights by unrelated normalized scale and eigenvalue method are all related to aggregation 
method. Researchers blame eigenvalue method for rank reversal because during normalization it 
produces different priority values in case of adding or deleting an alternative, which violates the 
order preservation concept. On the other hand, some researchers claim multiplying criteria 
weights by unrelated normalized scale (related to normalization procedure) is the cause since 
criteria weights usually are normalized solely based on their data domain which might differ 
from alternatives normalized scale. Hence, these causes could be reduced to inconsistency, 
aggregation method and pairwise comparison. The preference relations are built based on the 
later concept and it has been proven to be valid. In addition to that, Millet (1997) compared five 





pairwise comparison are more accurate than the others. Therefore, in this paper we are going to 
investigate inconsistency and aggregation methods for fuzzy preference relations.  
According to Chiclana et al. (2009), preference relations have three fundamental and hierarchical 
levels of rationality assumptions: 1) the first level requires indifference between any alternative 
   and itself, 2) the second level requires that if the decision-maker prefers    to    then they 
should not at the same time prefer    to   , and 3) the third level is related to transitivity among 
any three alternatives. There are a number of consistency properties in the literature. A few of 
these are: triangle condition, weak transitivity, max-min transitivity, max-max transitivity, 
restricted max-min transitivity, restricted max-max transitivity, multiplicative transitivity, and 
additive transitivity (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2004). Among these properties, additive and 
multiplicative transitivity are the most used and are equivalent to each other through a 
transformation function. The transitivity property is interpreted by the idea that the preference 
value of any two alternatives obtained directly by comparison should be equal to or greater than 
the preference value of an indirect alternative (intermediate alternative) that is between them 
(Herrera-Viedma et al., 2004). Furthermore, any property that enforces transitivity in the 
preferences is called a consistency property (Chiclana et al., 2009). 
4.1. Additive consistency  
From     two other formulations can be generated based on the characteristics of the reciprocal 
rule,             , as follows: 
                                                                                                                                              





Proposition 1: Let            be a fuzzy preference relation, then for every preference 
degree on   we can find its estimation based on the additive consistency through: 
     
 
      
                         
 
   
     
                                                                           
Proof: by taking the average of equations    ,     and     for     for   alternatives, the 
following equation is generated: 
  
    
 
  
               
 
   
                              
     
 
  
                         
 
   
 
     
 
  
                         
 
   




                      
     
 
  
                         
 
   




                          
     
 
  
                         
 
   




       
                                  
 
   
     
        
                                     
 
   
     
 
     
 
      
                         
 
   






For a reciprocal fuzzy preference relation,     can be re-written as: 
    
 
     
               
 
   
     
                                                                                                        
Definition 4: Let               a given reciprocal fuzzy preference relation and  
  
    
      be the estimated fuzzy preference relation calculated by    . Then the consistency 
degree of   is calculated by  
           
 
      
          
  
 
   
   
   
   
                                                                                         
Thus,     is used to check the consistency degree of any reciprocal fuzzy preference relation. 
When            then   is perfectly consistent; keeping in mind that     is a preference 
degree or preference intensity of alternative   over alternative  .  
The additive consistency implies dependency between alternatives, which is clear from the 
transitivity property. Thus, any change in the examined set of the alternatives implies a possible 
change on the preference degrees. This is correct, especially if the provided information is not 
perfectly consistent. To illustrate this, let us assume that the provided information for a set of   
alternatives is perfectly consistent. Then, if we remove an alternative     from the set     
                 , or if we add an alternative     to the set,   
                   . 
Therefore, the remaining preference degrees from     after   is modified maintain their 
valuations only if     is satisfied. This can only happen if the original information and the new 





Theorem 1: Based on additive consistency, a preference degree     
   maintains its valuation 
after removing or adding an alternative   from   if 
    
         
    
 
 
                     
 
 
                                                                        
Otherwise the preference relation    or      is not perfectly consistent. 
Proof: from   ,    
  
 
      
                         
 
   
     
, when we remove   from 
  we get: 
    
    
 
        
                         
   
   
     
     
 
            
 
      
                         
   
   
     
     
 
For       and          , then  
    
    
 
      
                         
   
   
     




      
                           







      
                                                             
 
   
      
 
For       and    , then  
    
  
 
      
                           
                                   
                                   
 
 
      
                                                      
                               
   
      
 
Thus, the only way    
        
  after removing   is if  
 
      





      
                                                    










      
                                                             
 
 
      
                       
                              
 
 
      
                             
Since, 
                                                           
                                                     
Then, 
 
           
                       
                                      
 
 
      
                             
Multiply both sides by            , we get, 
                                                             






                       
   
   
     
   
                          
 
      
                      
   
   
     
   
 
      
                          
 
      
                          
   
   
     
   
 
 




   
    
 
 




Also, we get the same conclusion when   is added to    
This shows how removing or adding an alternative could affect the entire information, especially 
when they are inconsistent. Thus, introducing new information implies a change in the original 
information, particularly if the new information is not consistent. Usually decision-makers do not 
revise their assessments based on the new information. In general, the decision-makers compare 
two alternatives at a time; however, when we consider the consistency of the information, all the 
alternatives need to be considered. So the decision-makers do not revise their previous 
assessments on a pair of alternatives if another alternative is removed or a new one is added. 
Moreover in real life, most decision-makers are not consistent in their opinions. Thus, how 
should we handle acceptably inconsistent information in a way to avoid rank reversal? Saaty 
(1980) suggested that the acceptable inconsistency (consistency ratio) should be less than 10%. 





relation and 8% for 4x4 preference relation. Aguaron and Moreno-Jiménez (2003) followed 
Saaty’s threshold suggestion and come up with 10% threshold for inconsistency measure for 
Geometric Mean Method. However, it seems there is no clear answer as to when a preference 
relation is considered to be inconsistent (Ishizaka and Labib, 2011).   
4.2. Aggregation methods 
Aggregation methods or operators are used to aggregate individual preference relations into a 
collective one. For example, in group decision-making, the individuals’ preference relations are 
aggregated into a collective preference relation. There are many aggregation operators in the 
literature; however, the most common one is the weighted averaging operator. The weighted 
averaging operator is defined as follows (Zhang et al., 2016; Wu and Xu, 2012): 
   
         
  
                                                                                                                                                
where    is the weight of decision-maker   such that      
 
   ,    
  is the given preference 
degree by decision-maker  ,   is the number of decision-makers, and    
  is the collective 
preference degree. The weighted averaging operator becomes an averaging operator when the 
decision-makers have equal weights. 
Proposition 2: Let        
      be a reciprocal fuzzy preference relation given by a decision-
maker  . When all   s are perfectly consistent then the collective preference relation is also 
perfectly consistent. 
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Similarly, when an arithmetic mean operator is used, the consistency is also maintained.  




    
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                          
Proof: from        
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Proposition 3: The constructed collective preference relation by arithmetic mean operator gains 
the mean consistency degrees of the individuals’ preference relations. Likewise, the constructed 
collective preference relation by the weighted averaging operator acquires the weighted 
averaging consistency degrees of the individuals’ preference relations. 
Proof: from     
                
 
      
      
     
         
   
   
   , then for         , we get: 
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This is also true for the weighted averaging operator  
For an inconsistent preference relation, removal or addition of an alternative   could play a 
significant role in altering the ranking order of the alternatives if   is the outbalance element 
among the alternatives. 






   
    
 
   
     
 
   
 




    
 
   
                                                                                                                  
where    is the score of alternative   and    
 
     . The higher the score of an alternative, the 
better it is. 
Theorem 2: Let the sum normalization method, equation   , be the way to generate the ranking 
scores for the alternatives, then the following are true if alternative   is removed: 
For   
     
  and      
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    if and only if 
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Proof: for      ,  
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   , this completed 
the proof  
This is also true when an alternative   is added. Therefore, rank reversal could occur when       
and       are not satisfied.  
Example 1: Suppose a decision-maker provides his assessments for one criterion on four 
alternatives using following reciprocal fuzzy preference relation: 






               
              
              
               
 
 
Based on      the consistency degree of this preference relation is 82%. By using     the 
following ranking scores are generated: 
                                     
However, when alternative    is removed, the consistency degree increases to 87% with the 





                              
Notice that   and    have been reversed. This is because    was the outbalance element that 
differentiating between   and   . In fact, this happens because       is violated: 
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Theorem 3: For any perfectly consistent reciprocal preference relation,      ,        and       
are satisfied by the additive consistency. 
Proof: from     
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Thus    
   
         
   
            . When the left hand side of this equals to 0, which 
means     
   
         
   
                        which satisfies    ,       
and        
Example 2: Suppose a decision-maker provides his assessments for one criterion on four 
alternatives using following reciprocal fuzzy preference relation: 






               
               
               
               
 
 
This preference relation is 100% consistent and yields following ranking scores using    : 
                                         
When    is removed, the consistency degree is still 100%. Likewise, the ranking order is: 
                           
There is no rank reversal because       is satisfied  
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5. Proposed Score Aggregation Methods  
Based on these results, the only way to ensure ranking order is free of rank reversal in the 
preference relations is by ensuring that the preference relation(s) is perfectly consistent. 
However, to some extent this is hard to achieve in real world problems, especially in a group 
decision-making environment where there is a tradeoff between consistencies and consensus 
(Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007a). Thus, we need to handle rank reversal when it is not desirable by 
maintaining some guidelines that deal with the dependency of the data/information. Here we 
present three scenarios that are possible to happen to the set of alternatives during the decision 
process: a new alternative is introduced, an existing alternative is removed, or a new one replaces 
an alternative.  
Note: This is only applied if the set of alternatives have been modified. 
Proposition 4: The following formulation does better than the sum normalization method in 
avoiding rank reversal in reciprocal preference relations when a new alternative,  , is introduced: 
   
    
     
 
              
 
      
                                                                                                            
where    






When     is perfectly consistent, then   
       
   since        
  thus  
   
    
     
 
              
 
      
 
      
 
           
      
 
     
   
   
      
   
   . However, when 
    has an acceptable consistency degree but       is not, then the ranking generated by the 
sum normalization method might be affected by the information of  . Thus, integrating the 
values driven by the consistency property     and the provided ones for   will improve the 
consistency degree of     . The chance of rank reversal decreases as the consistency increases.  
For   
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However, with    
        
   , after eliminating the constants in both sides we get, 
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When generating the ranking scores for       with sum normalization there is no rank reversal 
only if  
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but with      there is no rank reversal only if 
    
 
            
 
       
   
    
          , so clearly      has a higher possibility to 
avoid rank reversal than sum normalization. In addition,      ensures maintaining the sum of the 
scores of the alternatives at 1,     
   
        
Proposition 5: The following formulation does better than the sum normalization method in 
avoiding rank reversal in reciprocal preference relations when an alternative   is replaced by a 





   
   
     
   
         
          
 
  
                                                                                                              
Proof:  
Similar to the proof of the previous proposition. 
Proposition 6: The following formulation prevents rank reversal from occurring in reciprocal 
preference relations when an alternative,  , is removed: 
   
    
          
   
    
        
 
   
 
     
 
   
        
 
   
                                                                              
Proof: 
   
 
  
    
 
     
         
 
    , when   
     
  then 
      
     Thus if we divide both sides by any constant greater than zero, the inequality will 
not be affected. Therefore, we divide both sides by         
 
    since      
 
    is always 
less than   , where   is the number of alternatives of the original problem. We get: 
 
    
        
 
   
 
   
  
        
 
   
 
     
 
   
        
 
   
 
     
 
   
        
 
   
 
    
        
         , and this formulation also ensures maintaining the sum of the scores of 
the alternatives at 1,     
   
         





Suppose that four decision-makers provide their assessments (by fuzzy preference relations) on 
four alternatives as follows: 
    
                
                
                
               
                          
                
                
                
                
  
    
                
                
                
                
                          
                
                
                
                
  
After several rounds of discussion, they reach an acceptable level of consensus, which results in 
the following collective preference relation, which has been aggregated by a weighted averaging 
operator assuming equal weights for decision-makers: 
   






               
               
               
               
 
 
This preference relation is 95% consistent. If we calculate the ranking score by the sum 
normalization method    , then we get the following ranking order: 
                                       . 
A. Adding a new alternative 
Now consider that the decision-makers introduce a new alternative   . Going through the 





   





   
 
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                    
 
  
The consistency degree of this preference relation has dropped to 78.5% and the new ranking 
order by     is:  
                                                   
Notice that by introducing   , which is a non-dominant alternative, the ranking order for the first 
two alternatives has reversed. This is because the collective preference relation is not perfectly 
consistent and thus, there is no guarantee that       and       are satisfied. 
However, if we apply    , which relies on improving the consistency of the added alternative, 
we get the following ranking order:  
                                                  
This ranking order is similar to the original problem except that alternative    has been placed in 
its right ranking position among the alternatives. 
B. Replacing an alternative  
Now, let us consider that alternative    has been replaced by     in the original problem. The 





   
                                     
  




               
              
              
               
 
 
The following are the ranking orders obtained by the sum normalization method     and the 
proposed formula    , respectively: 
Obtained by    :                                          
Obtained by     :                                        
Note that both methods generate the same ranking order but with different score values. 
C. Removing an alternative 
Consider Example 1 again,  






               
              
              
               
 
 
Where the preference relation is 82% consistent and has the following ranking order, by    : 
                                      
We saw that when alternative    is removed, the consistency degree increases but the ranking 





                              
However, if we apply      we get the following ranking order: 
                            
which is consistent with the ranking order of the original problem. 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have proved that consistency of the data/information is the main cause of rank 
reversal in preference relation. Also, we have shown that when the preference relations are 
perfectly consistent then neither a weighted averaging aggregation operator nor an arithmetic 
mean aggregation operator could cause rank reversal. This is also true for the score aggregation 
operator, particularly, the sum normalization method. However, when the preference relation is 
inconsistent, which is usually the case in real life decision problems, then the score aggregation 
operator could generate rank reversal when the set of alternatives is modified. Thus, we proposed 
modified score aggregation operators that could be used when a change in the set of alternatives 
is done. The proposed score aggregation operators integrate the consistency element to reduce 
the chances of rank reversal. We show that the proposed operators perform better than the sum 
normalization method in avoiding rank reversal when a change happens in the set of alternatives. 
This work was based on additive consistency in reciprocal preference relation. As future work, 
we would like to extend this work to preference relation based on multiplicative consistency. 





investigate the possibility of establishing a score aggregation method that has the ability to 
handle rank reversal in general cases. 
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1. The paper deals with the subject of rank reversal in decision making.  
 
2. Reciprocal preference relations based on additive consistency are studied.  
 
3. Inconsistency of information and score aggregation are found as main causes. 
 
4. Two score aggregation methods are proposed. 
 
5. Numerical application shows better results than other tested methods.   
 
 
 
 
